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Complexity of Shift Bribery in Iterative Elections.
C. Maushagen, M. Neveling, J. Rothe, and A. Selker.
Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2018), Stockholm, Sweden. IFAAMAS, pages 1567-1575, July 2018.
A preliminary version appeared in the nonarchival website proceedings of the 15th International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics (ISAIM 2018), Fort Lauderdale, FL, USA. January 2018.


Strategic Behavior in Judgment Aggregation.
D. Baumeister, J. Rothe, and A. Selker.
Chapter 8 in Trends in Computational Social Choice, U. Endriss (editor), pp. 145-168. AI Access Foundation, 2017.


Minisum and Minimax Committee Election Rules for General Preference Types.
D. Baumeister, T. Böhnlein, L. Rey, O. Schaudt, and A. Selker.
Proceedings of the 22nd European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 2016), The Hague, The Netherlands. IOS Press, pages 1656–1657, August/September 2016.


Complexity of Bribery and Control for Uniform Premise-Based Quota Rules Under Various Preference Types.
D. Baumeister, J. Rothe, and A. Selker.
Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory (ADT 2015), Lexington, KY, USA. Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 9346, pages 432-448, September 2015.


Manipulative Angriffe auf Judgment-Aggregation-Prozeduren.
A. Selker.
Master Thesis. Institut für Informatik, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf, Germany, 50 pages, September 2014.