

Preference Aggregation by Voting: Algorithmics and Complexity

Präferenzaggregation durch Wählen: Algorithmik und Komplexität

Pingo

Wintersemester 2020/2021


Dozent: Prof. Dr. J. Rothe



Website

<https://pingo.coactum.de/>

Access Number:
885317



© Titanic Verlag

Question 1

Suppose some voting system $\mathcal{E}$ is immune to some control type $\mathcal{CT}$. Let $\mathcal{E}\text{-}\mathcal{CT}$ be the corresponding control problem. Which of the following statements are provably true?

- A $\mathcal{E}\text{-}\mathcal{CT}$ is NP-hard
- B $\mathcal{E}\text{-}\mathcal{CT}$ is NP-complete
- C $\mathcal{E}\text{-}\mathcal{CT}$ is in P
- D There is no provable connection between immunity of $\mathcal{E}$ to $\mathcal{CT}$ and the complexity of $\mathcal{E}\text{-}\mathcal{CT}$

Question 2

Anna, Belle: **c** **a** b **d**

Chris: **a** **d** b **c**

David: b **d** **a** **c**

Is it possible to partition $C = \{a, b, c, d\}$ into C_1 and C_2 such that when in the TP model the plurality winners of (C_1, V) and (C_2, V) run against each other, **c** is not the unique plurality winner?

A Yes, with $C_1 = \{a, b, c\}$ and $C_2 = \{d\}$

B No

C Yes, with $C_1 = \{a, c\}$ and $C_2 = \{b, d\}$

D Yes, with $C_1 = \{a, d\}$ and $C_2 = \{b, c\}$

Question 3

Anna, Belle: **c** **a** b **d**

Chris: **a** **d** b **c**

David: b **d** **a** **c**

Is it possible to partition $C = \{a, b, c, d\}$ into C_1 and C_2 such that when in the **TE** model the plurality winners of (C_1, V) and (C_2, V) run against each other, **c** is not the unique plurality winner?

A Yes, with $C_1 = \{a, b, c\}$ and $C_2 = \{d\}$

B No

C Yes, with $C_1 = \{a, c\}$ and $C_2 = \{b, d\}$

D Yes, with $C_1 = \{a, d\}$ and $C_2 = \{b, c\}$

Question 4

Consider an election (C, V) . Which of the following statements are true?

- A If c is the Condorcet winner of (C, V) , then c is also the Condorcet winner of each election (C', V) with $C' \subseteq C$ and $c \in C'$
- B Condorcet voting is immune to constructive control by adding candidates
- C If c is the plurality winner of (C, V) , then c is also the plurality winner of each election (C', V) with $C' \subseteq C$ and $c \in C'$
- D Plurality voting is immune to constructive control by adding candidates

Question 5

Anna, Belle: **c** **a** b **d**

Chris: **a** **d** b **c**

David: b **d** **a** **c**

Is it possible to partition $V = \{\text{Anna, Belle, Chris, David}\}$ into V_1 and V_2 such that when in the TP model the plurality winners of (C, V_1) and (C, V_2) run against each other, **c** is not the unique plurality winner?

A Yes, with $V_1 = \{\text{Anna, Belle}\}$ and $V_2 = \{\text{Chris, David}\}$

B No

C Yes, with $V_1 = \{\text{Anna, Belle, Chris}\}$ and $V_2 = \{\text{David}\}$

D Yes, with $V_1 = \{\text{Anna}\}$ and $V_2 = \{\text{Belle, Chris, David}\}$

Question 6

Anna, Belle: **c** **a** b **d**

Chris: **a** **d** b **c**

David: b **d** **a** **c**

Is it possible to partition $V = \{\text{Anna, Belle, Chris, David}\}$ into V_1 and V_2 such that when in the **TE** model the plurality winners of (C, V_1) and (C, V_2) run against each other, **c** is not the unique plurality winner?

A Yes, with $V_1 = \{\text{Anna, Belle}\}$ and $V_2 = \{\text{Chris, David}\}$

B No

C Yes, with $V_1 = \{\text{Anna, Belle, Chris}\}$ and $V_2 = \{\text{David}\}$

D Yes, with $V_1 = \{\text{Anna}\}$ and $V_2 = \{\text{Belle, Chris, David}\}$

Question 7

The traffic light rules in Germany.

Question 7

The traffic light rules in Germany. Is it true that anywhere on earth there exist traffic lights ...

- A ... where GREEN is ON TOP?
- B ... where GREEN is BLUE?
- C ... where pedestrians have YELLOW?
- D ... with horses for pedestrians?

Answer 7

The traffic light rules in Germany. Is it true that anywhere on earth there exist traffic lights ...

- A ... where **GREEN** is **ON TOP**?
- B ... where **GREEN** is **BLUE**?
- C ... where pedestrians have **YELLOW**?
- D ... with horses for pedestrians?

Answer 7

The traffic light rules in Germany. Is it true that anywhere on earth there exist traffic lights ...

- A ... where **GREEN** is **ON TOP**?
- B ... where **GREEN** is **BLUE**?
- C ... where pedestrians have **YELLOW**?
- D ... with horses for pedestrians?



Answer 7

The traffic light rules in Germany. Is it true that anywhere on earth there exist traffic lights ...


- A ... where **GREEN** is **ON TOP**?
- B ... where **GREEN** is **BLUE**?
- C ... where pedestrians have **YELLOW**?
- D ... with horses for pedestrians?



Answer 7

The traffic light rules in Germany. Is it true that anywhere on earth there exist traffic lights ...

- A ... where **GREEN** is **ON TOP**?
- B ... where **GREEN** is **BLUE**?
- C ... where pedestrians have **YELLOW**?
- D ... with horses for pedestrians?



Answer 7

The traffic light rules in Germany. Is it true that anywhere on earth there exist traffic lights ...

- A ... where **GREEN** is **ON TOP**?
- B ... where **GREEN** is **BLUE**?
- C ... where pedestrians have **YELLOW**?
- D ... with horses for pedestrians?



© Jelka Lerche for Die ZEIT, 2021