### Preference Aggregation by Voting: Algorithmics and Complexity

#### Präferenzaggregation durch Wählen: Algorithmik und Komplexität

#### Pingo Wintersemester 2020/2021

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Website

## https://pingo.coactum.de/

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Preference Aggregation by Voting

Let  $\ensuremath{\mathcal{E}}$  be a voiced voting system. Which of the following statements is true?

- A  $\mathcal{E}$  is susceptible to DCDC.
- B  $\mathcal{E}$  is susceptible to DCAC.
- C If  $\mathcal{E}$  is not susceptible to CCDV, then  $\mathcal{E}$  is not susceptible to DCAV.
- D  $\mathcal{E}$  is not susceptible to CCAV.



Anna :	а	b	d	С
Belle, Chris:	С	d	b	а
David:	d	b	а	С

Can c be prevented from being the unique plurality winner by deleting exactly one candidate (other than c)?

- A Yes, by deleting  $\{a\}$ .
- B Yes, by deleting {b}.
- C Yes, by deleting {d}.
- D No.

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#### Question 3

Anna :	а	b	d	С
Belle, Chris:	С	d	b	а
David:	d	b	а	С

Can c be prevented from being the unique plurality winner by deleting at most two candidates (other than c)?

- A Yes, by deleting  $\{a, b\}$ .
- B Yes, by deleting  $\{a, d\}$ .
- C Yes, by deleting  $\{b, d\}$ .
- D No.

Let  $\mathcal{E}$  be a voting system. Which of the following statements is true?

- A If  $\mathcal E$  is not susceptible to DCAC, then  $\mathcal E$  is not susceptible to CCPV-TE.
- B If  $\mathcal{E}$  is not susceptible to DCAV, then  $\mathcal{E}$  is not susceptible to CCPV-TE.
- C If  $\mathcal{E}$  is susceptible to DCAV, then  $\mathcal{E}$  is susceptible to CCPV-TE.
- D If  $\mathcal E$  is not susceptible to DCDV, then  $\mathcal E$  is not susceptible to CCAV.



Anna :	а	b	d	С
Belle, Chris, David:	С	d	b	а
Edgar:	d	b	а	С

Can c be prevented from being the unique plurality winner by deleting exactly one voter?

- A Yes, by deleting Anna or Belle.
- B Yes, by deleting David or Edgar.
- C Yes, by deleting Belle or Chris.
- D No.



Anna :	а	b	d	С
Belle, Chris, David:	С	d	b	а
Edgar:	d	b	а	С

Can c be prevented from being the unique plurality winner by deleting at most two voters?

- A Yes, by deleting Anna and Belle.
- B Yes, by deleting Belle and David.
- C Yes, by deleting Chris and Edgar.

D No.

Which of the following voting systems is immune to destructive control by deleting candidates?

- A Plurality
- B Condorcet
- C Borda
- D Approval