

# Preference Aggregation by Voting: Algorithmics and Complexity

Präferenzaggregation durch Wählen: Algorithmik und Komplexität

Pingo

Wintersemester 2020/2021


Dozent: Prof. Dr. J. Rothe



## Website

<https://pingo.coactum.de/>


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# Question 1

Anna:    **Barca**    Real    **Juve**    **FCB**  
Belle:    **Juve**    Real    **FCB**    **Barca**  
Chris:    **Barca**    **FCB**    Real    **Juve**  
David:    **FCB**    Real    **Barca**    **Juve**  
Edgar:    Real    **FCB**    **Barca**    **Juve**



Who wins this regular cup protocol?

A **Barca**


B **FCB**

C **Juve**

D **Real**

## Question 2

Anna:    **Barca**    Real    **Juve**    **FCB**  
 Belle:    **Juve**    Real    **FCB**    **Barca**  
 Chris:    **Barca**    **FCB**    Real    **Juve**  
 David:    **FCB**    Real    **Barca**    **Juve**  
 Edgar:




How should Edgar vote to help the Bayern win?

- A **Barca**    **FCB**    **Juve**    Real
- B **FCB**    **Barca**    Real    **Juve**
- C **Barca**    Real    **Juve**    **FCB**
- D Real    **FCB**    **Barca**    **Juve**

## Question 3

Anna:   Barca   Real   Juve   FCB  
 Belle:   Juve   Real   FCB   Barca  
 Chris:   Barca   FCB   Real   Juve  
 David:   FCB   Barca   Real   Juve  
 Edgar:   Real   FCB   Barca   Juve



Assigning which teams to which leaves makes the Bayern win?

- A Barca   FCB   Juve   Real
- B FCB   Real   Barca   Juve
- C FCB   Juve   Barca   Real
- D FCB   Barca   Real   Juve

## Question 4

Anna:	a	b	c	d
Belle:	b	a	d	c
Chris:	c	d	a	b
David:	d	a	b	c
Edgar:	d	b	c	a

Who wins this Copeland election?

A a

B b

C c

D d

## Question 5

Anna:	a	b	c	d
Belle:	b	a	d	c
Chris:	c	d	a	b
David:	d	a	b	c
Edgar:	d	b	c	a

Who wins this maximin election?

A a

B b

C c

D d

## Question 6

Anna:    a    b    c    d

Belle:   b    a    d    c

Chris:   c    d    a    b

David:   d    a    b    c

Edgar:   d    b    c    a

If Belle votes strategically under maximin to make b win (perhaps nonuniquely), what would be her preference?

A a    c    d    b

B b    d    c    a

C b    c    d    a

D b    d    a    c



## Question 7

Anna:	a	b	c	d
Belle:	<b>b</b>	<b>c</b>	<b>d</b>	<b>a</b>
Chris:	c	d	a	b
David:	d	a	b	c
Edgar:	d	b	c	a

Who wins this manipulated election under Copeland?

A a

B b

C c

D d

## Question 8

For an NP algorithm to accept its input, it is required that . . .

- A . . . all paths of the computation tree are accepting
- B . . . at least half of the paths in the computation tree are accepting
- C . . . at most one of the paths in the computation tree are accepting
- D . . . at least one of the paths in the computation tree are accepting