

Preference Aggregation by Voting: Algorithmics and Complexity

Präferenzaggregation durch Wählen: Algorithmik und Komplexität

Pingo

Wintersemester 2020/2021


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Website

<https://pingo.coactum.de/>

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Question 1

When will the lecture start?

A 8:40 Uhr

B 8:30 Uhr

Question 2

I'm here today because ...

- A ... I want to see my candidate winning!
- B ... I want to know more about how to aggregate preferences.
- C ... I hate to lose an election!
- D ... I want to know how to protect elections against manipulative attacks.

Question 3

Jamaica failed. The traffic light failed. Now the elections for the 20th Bundestag have to be repeated. Please give your vote (for just a single party) here:

- A AfD
- B Bündnis 90/Grüne
- C CDU
- D Die Linke
- E FDP
- F SPD
- G Sonstige
- H Enthaltung

Question 4

Which of the following are correct?

- A A majority winner is always a plurality winner.
- B A plurality winner is always a majority winner.
- C For two candidates and three voters, a plurality winner is always a majority winner.
- D Borda satisfies the majority criterion.

Question 5




Figure: Anna, Belle, and Chris are voting on which game to play

Who is winning under Condorcet voting?

- A Chess
- B Yahtzee
- C Poker
- D None of these games

Question 6




Figure: Anna, Belle, and Chris are voting on which game to play

Who is winning under Dodgson voting?

- A All of these games
- B Chess
- C Yahtzee
- D Poker

Question 7

Which of the following voting systems fails monotonicity?

- A Plurality
- B Dodgson
- C Condorcet
- D Borda

Question 8

Consider the election (C, V) with $C = \{a, b, c, d\}$ and V :

$v_1 : \quad c \quad b \quad a \quad d$

$v_2 : \quad a \quad d \quad c \quad b$

$v_3 : \quad b \quad a \quad c \quad d$

$v_4 : \quad d \quad b \quad a \quad c$

- A a and b are the plurality winners.
- B a and b are the Borda winners.
- C a and b are the veto winners.
- D a and b are the Dodgson winners.

Question 9

Is it true that the following voting system always has a winner?

- A Plurality
- B Majority
- C Borda
- D Condorcet

Question 10

Is it true that if the following voting system has a winner, this winner must be unique?

- A Plurality
- B Majority
- C Borda
- D Condorcet

Question 11

In the definition of monotonicity of a voting system, preference profiles are modified so as to improve the position of a winner. Suppose $a b c d$ is a vote in a preference profile and c is a winner. Which of the following are relevant modifications of this vote for this definition?

A $c b a d$

B $c a b d$

C $a c b d$

D $b a d c$

Question 12

In the definition of **strong** monotonicity of a voting system, preference profiles are modified so as to improve the position of a winner.

Suppose **a b c d** is a vote in a preference profile and c is a winner.

Which of the following are relevant modifications of this vote for this definition?

A $c b a d$

B $c a b d$

C $a c b d$

D $b a d c$