Algorithmic Game Theory Algorithmische Spieltheorie Pingo Wintersemester 2022/2023

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Pingo

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Suppose you have won \$ 1,000,000 because you were able to prove $P \neq NP.$ Which of the following claims can be true?

- A PARTITION $\leq_m^p DUMMY$
- **B** PARTITION $\leq_m^p \overline{\text{DUMMY}}$
- **C** $\overline{\text{PARTITION}} \leq_m^p \text{DUMMY}$
- **D PARTITION** $\leq_m^p \overline{\text{DUMMY}}$

Which of the following are Yes-instances of PARTITION?

- A (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
- B(1,2,3,4,5,6,7)
- C(1, 5, 5, 7)
- D (1,3,5,7)
- E (11, 15, 23, 51)

Which of the following claims is/are true?

- A In the proof that DUMMY is coNP-complete, given the instance (1,3,5,7) of PARTITION, we construct a weighted voting game G = (2,6,10,14,1;17) in which player 5 is pivotal for $\{1,4\}$.
- B In the proof that DUMMY is coNP-complete, given the instance (1, 5, 5, 7) of PARTITION, we construct a weighted voting game G = (2, 10, 10, 14, 1; 19) in which player 5 is pivotal for $\{1, 4\}$.
- C If $coNP \subseteq NP$ then coNP = NP.
- D If NP = P then coNP = P.

Consider the weighted voting game G = (2, 2, 2; 4). In terms of the Shapley–Shubik index, is splitting into two players of equal weight for, say, the third player ...

- A ... beneficial?
- B ... neutral?
- C ... disadvantageous?

Consider the weighted voting game G = (2, 2, 2; 5). In terms of the Shapley–Shubik index, is splitting into two players of equal weight for, say, the third player ...

- A ... beneficial?
- B ... neutral?
- C ... disadvantageous?

Consider the weighted voting game G = (2, 2, 2; 6). In terms of the Shapley–Shubik index, is splitting into two players of equal weight for, say, the third player ...

- A ... beneficial?
- B ... neutral?
- C ... disadvantageous?