Third International Workshop on Computational Social Choice
Düsseldorf, Germany, September 13–16, 2010


Proceedings were not published formally but were distributed as a bound volume:

Vincent Conitzer and Jörg Rothe (editors).
Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC-2010), printed by Düsseldorf University Press, September 2010.

Available as a PDF file.

Individual papers may also be accessed directly via the program page. The copyright for all papers lies with the individual authors.

The accepted papers are:

  1. Sven O. Krumke and Clemens Thielen. Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions in Dominant Strategies
  2. Clemens Thielen and Stephan Westphal. A Combinatorial Algorithm for Strong Implementation of Social Choice Functions
  3. Yiling Chen, John K. Lai, David C. Parkes, and Ariel D. Procaccia. Truth, Justice, and Cake Cutting
  4. Ceyhun Coban and M. Remzi Sanver. Social Choice without the Pareto Principle under Weak Independence
  5. Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, and Arkadii Slinko. Distance Rationalization of Voting Rules
  6. Nadja Betzler. On Problem Kernels for Possible Winner Determination Under the k-Approval Protocol
  7. Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Edith Hemaspaandra, and Lane A. Hemaspaandra. Bypassing Combinatorial Protections: Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Single-Peaked Electorates
  8. Noga Alon, Felix Fischer, Ariel D. Procaccia, and Moshe Tennenholtz. Sum of Us: Strategyproof Selection from the Selectors
  9. Michael Zuckerman, Omer Lev, and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. An Algorithm for the Coalitional Manipulation Problem under Maximin
  10. Mirco Gelain, Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi, Kristen Brent Venable, and Toby Walsh. Local Search for Stable Marriage Problems
  11. Davide Grossi and Paolo Turrini. Dependence in Games and Dependence Games
  12. Ning Chen and Arpita Ghosh. Algorithms for Pareto Stable Assignment
  13. Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi, Kristen Brent Venable, and Toby Walsh. Stable Marriage Problems with Quantitative Preferences
  14. Ronald L. Rivest and Emily Shen. An Optimal Single-Winner Preferential Voting System Based on Game Theory
  15. Reshef Meir, Maria Polukarov, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Convergence to Equilibria in Plurality Voting
  16. Victor Naroditskiy, Maria Polukarov, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Optimization in Payments in Dominant Strategy Mechanisms for Single-Parameter Domains
  17. Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, and Hans Georg Seedig. Optimal Partitions in Additively Separable Hedonic Games
  18. Yonatan Aumann and Yair Dombb. The Efficiency of Fair Division with Connected Pieces
  19. Sylvain Bouveret, Ulle Endriss, and Jérôme Lang. Fair Division under Ordinal Preferences: Computing Envy-Free Allocations of Indivisible Goods
  20. Noam Hazon and Edith Elkind. Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting
  21. Andreas Darmann, Christian Klamler, and Ulrich Pferschy. A Maximin Approach to Finding Fair Spanning Trees
  22. Felix Brandt. Group-Strategyproof Irresolute Social Choice Functions
  23. Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, and Hans Georg Seedig. On the Fixed-Parameter Tractability of Composition-Consistent Tournament Solutions
  24. Ulle Endriss, Umberto Grandi, and Daniele Porello. Complexity of Winner Determination and Strategic Manipulation in Judgment Aggregation
  25. Ilan Nehama. Approximate Judgement Aggregation
  26. Toby Walsh. Online Cake Cutting
  27. Koji Takamiya. Complexity Consideration on the Existence of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions
  28. Tatyana Gvozdeva, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, and Arkadii Slinko. Three Hierarchies of Simple Games Parameterized by "Resource'' Parameters
  29. Arkadii Slinko, Piotr Faliszewski, and Edith Elkind. Cloning in Elections
  30. Péter Biró and Tamás Fleiner. Fractional solutions for NTU-games
  31. Tyler Lu and Craig Boutilier. Budgeted Social Choice: A Framework for Multiple Recommendations in Consensus Decision Making
  32. Nadja Betzler, Robert Bredereck, and Rolf Niedermeier. Partial Kernelization for Rank Aggregation: Theory and Experiments
  33. Britta Dorn and Ildikó Schlotter. Multivariate Complexity Analysis of Swap Bribery
  34. Ioannis Caragiannis, Dimitris Kalaitzis, and Evangelos Markakis. Approximation Algorithms and Mechanism Design for Minimax Approval Voting
  35. Lirong Xia, Jérôme Lang, and Jérôme Monnot. Possible Winners When New Alternatives Join: New Results Coming Up!
  36. Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Nikos Karanikolas, and Ariel D. Procaccia. Socially Desirable Approximations for Dodgson's Voting Rule
  37. Mark C. Wilson and Reyhaneh Reyhani. The Probability of Safe Manipulation
  38. Gábor Erdélyi and Michael Fellows. Parameterized Control Complexity in Bucklin Voting and in Fallback Voting
  39. Jessica Davies, George Katsirelos, Nina Narodytska, and Toby Walsh. An Empirical Study of Borda Manipulation
In addition, the following papers have been accepted for presentation in a special LogICCC session at the LogICCC Tutorial Day (right after the tutorials):
  1. Rudolf Berghammer and Stefan Bolus. Problem Solving on Simple Games via BDDs
  2. José Luis García-Lapresta and David Pérez-Román. Consensus Measures Generated by Weighted Kemeny Distances on Linear Orders
  3. Sara L. Uckelman and Joel Uckelman. Strategy and Manipulation in Medieval Elections